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1853 · Asia · 19th century · Fold

1853: Perry in Edo Bay and the Crimean War

In the same year that an American squadron forced Japan open, Britain and France went to war with Russia over the Ottoman Empire. The two events look unrelated until you notice that both were about what a non-industrial state could refuse a naval power.

Era map plate for 1853: Perry in Edo Bay and the Crimean War: Asia, 8 July 1853 – 31 March 1854
Era map · Asia · impact 4 of 6 · spans 2 years
Span
8 July 1853 – 31 March 1854
Place
Edo Bay; the Black Sea and the Crimea
Form
Parallel — Two regions, two chains, the same window of time.
Regions
Asia and Europe
Published
2026-10-22

What made it possible

  • American whaling and the China trade needed coaling stations and safe ports in the western Pacific, and shipwrecked American sailors in Japan had been treated harshly under the exclusion laws.
  • Japan's 1639 seclusion policy allowed only Dutch and Chinese trade at Nagasaki under strict supervision, and any foreign approach elsewhere was to be repelled by force.
  • The Opium War's outcome was well known in Japan through Dutch reports, which gave the shogunate a clear model of what refusal might cost.
  • In Europe, the Ottoman Empire's weakness — the 'Eastern Question' — had been managed by the 1841 Straits Convention, which Russia regarded as a temporary arrangement rather than a settlement.

Who acted

Commodore Matthew C. Perry
Commanded the East India Squadron; refused to move to Nagasaki and demanded to negotiate at the capital
Abe Masahiro
Senior councillor who broke with precedent by consulting the daimyo before replying to the American letter
Tsar Nicholas I
Pressed for a protectorate over Ottoman Orthodox subjects, which triggered the war
Earl of Aberdeen
British prime minister who entered the war reluctantly and resigned when it went badly

Two ways to refuse a warship

Perry's instructions allowed him to use force if he was refused, and his tactics — refusing the designated port of Nagasaki, surveying Edo Bay, landing with an armed escort — were designed to make the cost of refusal visible without firing. The shogunate's response was to accept the letter and ask for time, which it used to consult the daimyo for the first time on a matter of foreign policy.

The Ottomans, by contrast, refused Russia's demand for a formal protectorate over Orthodox subjects and chose war with a European great power's backing. They got the backing and survived the war, but the price was that the powers now guaranteed their territory in a treaty they had not drafted, which set up the far more destructive interventions of the 1870s and 1910s.

The internal politics each produced

In Japan, consulting the daimyo turned a foreign-policy crisis into a constitutional one: once the great houses had opinions on how to answer the Americans, the shogunate could no longer claim sole authority over foreign affairs. The slogan sonno joi — revere the emperor, expel the barbarians — moved from rhetoric to programme, and the shogunate's inability to close the country after 1854 discredited it from below.

In Russia, the war exposed serfdom's logistics: an army of conscripts bound to the land could not be mobilised or equipped as fast as a French or British one. The emancipation decree of 1861 and the introduction of universal military service in 1874 were direct results, and both were framed as military necessities rather than as liberal reforms.

  • Japan 1854: two ports opened, no tariff clause, no extraterritoriality.
  • Japan 1858: full commercial treaty with 5 per cent tariffs and consular jurisdiction.
  • Russia 1856: demilitarised Black Sea; the fleet scuttled at Sevastopol.
  • Russia 1861: emancipation of about 23 million serfs.
  • Russia 1874: universal military service introduced.

Why the comparison is worth making

Both states were told, in effect, that their internal arrangements were a strategic liability. Japan's answer was a rapid transfer of political authority to a government that could reform; Russia's answer was to reform the existing autocracy and hope it would hold. By 1905 the two paths met at Tsushima, where a Japanese fleet built with British help and commanded by officers trained abroad destroyed a Russian fleet sent from the Baltic.

That outcome was not determined in 1853. What was determined then was that both states would spend the next fifty years reorganising to meet a naval power, and that the reorganisations would be judged by whether they produced a state that could fight.

Sources

The facts in this entry were checked against the reference works and archives below.

Consequence: short and long

Immediately

Japan signed its first unequal treaty in 1854 and a full commercial one in 1858; Russia lost the Black Sea fleet and the right to keep warships there for fifteen years.

Over the long run

Japan's response to the same kind of pressure was to reorganise: the shogunate's consultation of the daimyo widened political participation, the 1868 Meiji government bought foreign technology and reformed land tenure, and by 1905 Japan was a naval power that defeated Russia at Tsushima. Russia's response was to reform from above: the 1861 emancipation of the serfs and the military reforms of the 1860s–70s were designed to make the empire capable of fighting a European war. The two tracks diverged in outcome because one state was small enough to restructure and the other was too large to do so quickly.

The usual misconception

That Perry's arrival alone caused the Meiji Restoration. The treaty was signed by the shogunate, and the domestic crisis it triggered ran for fifteen more years, driven as much by succession politics, famine and the shogunate's failed reforms as by foreign pressure. The 1858 commercial treaty, not 1853, is the date most Japanese contemporaries identified as the point of no return.

Sources

  • Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (2000) — Standard synthesis; strong on the 1853–68 interlude.
  • W. G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (1972) — Treats the treaties as the trigger for shogunate reform and its failure.
  • Orlando Figes, The Crimean War: A History (2010) — Covers the Russian side of the war and its domestic consequences.

Editorial note: Annals Fold is written for general readers and gives one reading of a contested record, not professional historical, legal or academic advice. Dates and interpretations shift as scholarship does, so check the sources above before relying on this entry.

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